Showing posts with label avon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label avon. Show all posts

Monday, December 23, 2013

Why Ackman and Icahn could both be right about Herbalife

The Carl Icahn vs. Bill Ackman spat over Herbalife    was probably the most entertaining public feud in 2013. It's very rare that two high profile investors go head-to-head in this manner. Moreover, in doing so, they put their reputations at risk in a very public manner. It's difficult not to conclude that Icahn has come out the winner in 2013. Herbalife's stock is up over 130% this year, and Ackman's short position has hurt his fund. However, is it possible that both investors are right?

What matters to direct-sales companies
Herbalife belongs within a class of companies that use a direct-sales model. In other words, they rely on local representatives to generate their sales revenue. There is nothing new about this model. In fact, Tupperware Brands parties and rictus-grinned Avon Products  ladies knocking on the door have become part of most Americans' vocabulary. In addition, Nu Skin Enterprises a stock up more than 250% this year) and Herbalife are rapidly acquiring household awareness.

All these companies critically rely on their representatives to generate sales. Nu Skin can talk all it likes about the science behind its skin-care products and Herbalife can wax lyrical about the benefits of its nutritional products, but if their sales distributors aren't motivated then their businesses will fail. Keeping representatives happy isn't easy. For example, Avon has been forced to fundamentally restructure its sales organization after some disappointing performance.

The bottom line is that these businesses don't solely rely on the intrinsic value of their products. The good news is that having products targeted at growth industries such as skin care (Nu Skin) and nutrition (Herbalife) is obviously going to inspire distributors and their customers. In addition, Tupperware has gone to great lengths to expand into emerging markets, therefore tapping into a new distributor base to offset its slow growth in North America.

Enter George Soros
Ackman's short arguments on Herbalife center around the lack of intrinsic value of its products (he cited poor price comparisons for Herbalife products on eBay),  and his belief that the company is structured to sell products to its distributors. He may well turn out to be right!

However, the entry of George Soros as an investor in Herbalife goes a long way to help explain why -- even if you are sympathetic to Ackman -- it's dangerous to short in this sort of situation.

Soros is best known for his theory of reflexivity, and how it causes investment bubbles. The basic idea is that pricing movements generate feedback loops into earnings, which then encourage higher pricing. A bubble is formed, which then collapses when a tipping point is reached.

The key point to understand here is that the positive effect on earnings from the feedback loop makes the stock look fundamentally cheap. In other words, this isn't about a stock reaching a sky high valuation! In fact, the stock will look a great value. Confused? I will try and explain what could happen with these direct sales companies and their distributors.



How the bubble might burst, but not when you are shortSay, for example, a listed direct sales company launches a new product that captures distributors imagination. It could be anything. Perfume, laundry powder, skin cream, nutritional tablets or whatever.

Sales start slowly and hit a $1 million a year, the company trades on ten times earnings or $10 million, and has had steady 5% growth for a while. So its P/E ratio is 10, and its PEG (PE divided by growth rate) ratio is 2.

Suddenly, the product starts to accelerate sales, a buzz forms around the product and more distributors are recruited. Sales go up 20% for the company, as does its earnings. A sober and conservative analyst produces a report stating that its growth rate is now 20%, with projected earnings of $1.2 million.

He goes on to argue that if it trades on its previous PEG ratio of 2, and its growth is 20%, then the 'correct' P/E valuation should now be 40 times earnings. So, now its valuation should be $48 million instead of $10 million. Remember what I said above about the fundamentals looking cheap?

After a while, the product's popularity starts to peter out. New distributors find it tough to become profitable. Sales start to slow again, then suddenly everyone is looking at their stock holding in a company on a valuation of current 48 times earnings with a 5% growth rate again. The stock crashes. It could even be on 20 times earnings and still be very expensive at this point.

Again, the key point is that Herbalife, Nu Skin and the others all have a critical reliance on their ability to recruit and maintain distributors. The problem is that no one rings a bell when the crash is about to come, and you could find yourself shorting a stock that just moved from a valuation of 10 times earnings to 48 times.

Why Ackman and Icahn may both be right
If this is the sort of scenario (and I stress "if") that awaits Nu Skin and Herbalife, then investors need to consider what stage these companies are at in this process. Are you buying/selling it in the middle of the bubble-like euphoria? Do you really want to short a stock during this strong momentum phase?

Ackman and Icahn may both turn out to be right. Icahn may end up being lauded for riding the stock higher and getting out early. Ackman could be feted for sticking to his guns while he waits for the inevitable collapse. If this scenario is correct, then the only ones not winning any prizes will be the long-term investors who are stuck in their positions after the possible collapse.

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

Is Tupperware a Good Stock to Buy on Emerging Market Prospects Alone?






Tupperware is an interesting emerging market growth stock. It offers a curious mix of significant exposure to high growth emerging markets, a secular growth story with its direct distribution model and, a relatively recession resistant business model. On the downside, currency fluctuations play a major role in dictating profitability and their established markets appear to be low growth. I’ll try to outline these points in turn.

Emerging Markets Becoming More Important to Tupperware

Firstly, here is how segmental profits have developed over the years and note how the profit mix is shifting towards Asia/Pacific…



Percentage Share of Segmental Profits



2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Rolling to Q3 2010
Europe
76.68%
52.83%
45.68%
45.56%
43.18%
40.20%
Asia Pacific
13.50%
20.79%
21.40%
23.81%
23.68%
25.54%
TW N Amer
0.33%
4.77%
8.77%
10.20%
11.48%
12.90%
Beauty N A
9.22%
8.01%
27.28%
22.27%
15.73%
14.34%
Beauty Int
0.26%
13.60%
-3.13%
-1.84%
5.94%
7.01%


It's worth noting that 'Europe' includes areas such as South Africa, Russia and Turkey, which have been high growth areas for them.  They are doing well in emerging markets but there appears to be a consolidated decline within established markets.

However, the situation is somewhat affected by executive issues at Beauty North America (BeautiControl) of which, they appear to have stabilized. The latter issue is somewhat embarrassing given that the CEO Rick Goings is a former US head of Avon Products.

Developed Markets Stabilizing and Restructuring in Place

Here are the sales numbers for the divisions on a five year basis...


2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Rolling to Q3 2010
Total Sales
1279
1743
1981
2161.8
2127
2271
Europe
602.5
615.9
688.2
769.6
749.6
788.6
Asia Pacific
204.5
239.7
292.4
336.1
385
440
TW N Am
253.6
255.5
289.8
303.3
292.3
316.3
Beauty N A
146.7
150
461.5
460.7
391.6
400.6
Beauty Int
72
482.6
249.5
292.1
309
325.9


The issues with Beauty North America are well expressed here, but they seem to have stablized to low growth. However as noted above, this division only contributes 14% of profits. Furthermore, if we look at segmental profits...


2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Rolling to Q3 2010
Europe
116.4
96.3
111
123.8
143.3
153.6
Asia Pacific
20.5
37.9
52
64.7
78.6
97.6
TW Nor A
0.5
8.7
21.3
27.7
38.1
49.3
Beauty N A
14
14.6
66.3
60.5
52.2
54.8
Beauty Int
0.4
24.8
-7.6
-5
19.7
26.8


...we see that the situation has been turned around. Nevertheless, the trend of slower growth in North America (Tupperware and Beauty) appears to be established.

A Recession Resistant Business Model?

 However, as noted in the initial paragraph, although this is slower growth it is relatively recession resistant. This is because when a recession bites, Tupperware will find it easier to recruit direct sales people to go out and sell their products on a part time basis. We can see that here...

<><><><><><><><><><><><>
Active Sales Force by Segment
200720082009       Q3 2010
Europe97192100,660106,64591,358
Asia Pacific4136147,37062,41972,726
TW Nor A6720475,92786,83288,548
Beauty N A341,875338,315326,251341,140
Beauty Int239,802240,758232,137234,029


The sales force in Europe and North America expanded dramatically during the recession. However, within Asia Pacific, an even more dramatic expansion took place.

Asia Pacific has another, more secular, profit driver. Not only is consumer discretionary picking up there, but Tupperware's direct distribution model works well in allowing women to generate part time income. A similar growth story is occurring with Avon Products, Revlon and Estee Lauder who are all, doing well within emerging markets.


Conclusions: Is Tupperware a Good Buy?

I confess to having a few concerns here. Tupperware North America appears to be set for low growth and I am also very concerned about a slowdown in developed Europe. I think increasing Sovereign Debt fears will reduce growth prospects for mainstream Europe in 2011. However, I note that this should result in an increased sales force, albeit with lower sales per person.

The emerging market growth story is compelling and, I believe, offers a cyclical (consumerisation) and secular (expansion of business model) growth story. Moreover, I expect emerging market profit contribution to be greater than that of North America by end 2011. The company already states that 60% of their sales are to emerging markets. In addition, this is including weak performance in Russia thanks to an accounting error and some one-off operational issues. Hopefully, these will be resolved.

Ultimately, I like prospects here and the way this stock will perform within a portfolio. It offers interesting and diversified profit drivers. Admittedly, it will not like strong US Dollar, but then again I am not a US resident.

 Analysts have it on an EPS of $3.62 and $4.17 for 2010 and 2011 respectively. At a share price of $47.68 this gives a PE ratio for Tupperware of 13.2x and 11.4x respectively. Furthermore, I have it on a current free cash flow yield of 5.7% which is good, considering they look set to grow earnings in the mid teens. I'll pick some up.


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